My essay for the course on philosophy of mind I attended last fall semester is a futile attempt to take on the blatant naturalism that dominates North American philosophy of mind.
That text would need to be much longer to do the work I want it to do. But others have already done that, among them Dan Zahavi that I quote extensively.
Anyway, it was fun doing some academic writing for the first time in years.
@drbjork Interesting writeup!
I must raise the point: what do you make of the version of methodological naturalism that does not require identity or priority of methods between science and philosophy, but merely the possibility of integration? I think for a lot of people who call themselves naturalists (myself included), the notion of naturalism that you criticise (reductionist, both ontological and methodological, physicalist) would be too heavyweight.
@okf "Naturalism" means too many things! The weaker kind of naturalism you describe is less of a problem on a conceptual level, of course, but it also comes down to practice. In practice, as a psychologist, I have more problem with the naive reductionism of much of clinical psychology than I have with the explicit physicalism of Armstrong.
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